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“This is the happy warrior, This is he…”
—Sir Herbert Read1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Discovering that the United States government has
experimented on unwitting and un-consenting American citizens is a
difficult pill to swallow, especially when some of those American
citizens are United States Armed Forces service members. This
scenario begs the question: what happens now? Now that the U.S.
government has finished its classified experimentation, where does
this leave the soldier who wanted to defend and serve his country, but

Ms. Brandy Michele Disbennett, Esq., Roger Williams University School of Law.
Ms. Disbennett works for Bergmann & Moore, LLC, a veteran’s disability
compensation law firm.
1
Sir Herbert Read, The Happy Warrior, in THE WAR POETS 138 (Robert Giddings
ed., 1988).
∗
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is now a victim of his government? Where does this leave “the happy
warrior”?2
This paper will explore the top-secret Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) human medical experiment, MKULTRA, and the
possible avenues of relief for service members involved in the project.
First, the veteran may bring suit against the U.S. government for
constitutional violations, or in a civil tort action. However, due to the
evolution of the doctrine and cases such as Chappell v. Wallace,
United States v. Stanley, and Feres v. United States, veterans will
likely be unable to recover a remedy in court.3
Second, a veteran may recover under the Department of
Veterans’ Affairs (VA) disability compensation system.4 Serviceconnected disability compensation is a monthly, monetary benefit paid
to a veteran upon a showing to the VA that the veteran was disabled
due to an injury arising out of, or aggravated by, their active-duty
military service.5 However, a veteran used as an unwitting test subject
in MKULTRA would have a difficult time surmounting the burden of
proof the VA system requires. But given recent court decisions,
namely AZ v. Shinseki, it may be possible to alleviate some of the
veteran’s burden of proof involving MKULTRA claims.6
This article will take a brief look into the history of human
medical trials, followed by a history of the CIA program MKULTRA,
and other related programs. Next, it will explore case law that bars
veterans from constitutional remedies as well as tort remedies against
the U.S. government. Finally, the article will discuss challenges for
veterans in the VA disability compensation system to determine if
MKULTRA victims could successfully seek service-connection.
Ultimately, a veteran attempting to recover damages from MKULTRA
testing will likely be unable to prevail under a constitutional analysis,
but an MKULTRA victim may be able to seek service-connection
under the VA.

2

See Read, supra note 1.
See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S.
296 (1983); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
4
See 38 C.F.R. § 3.4 (2013).
5
See id.; see also Veterans with Service-Connected Disabilities, FEDERAL BENEFITS
3

FOR
VETERANS, DEPENDENTS AND SURVIVORS, DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF.

34 (2014),
available at
http://www.va.gov/opa/publications/benefits_book/2014_Federal_Benefits_for_Vete
rans_English.pdf.
6
See AZ v. Shinseki, 731 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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THE EVOLUTION OF MEDICAL ETHICS

Throughout the course of American history, science has
demanded discovery. However, when answering the call of duty,
scientists, whether privately-funded or government-sponsored, have
frequently tested drug technologies on humans.7 During the 1960s, the
United States began scrutinizing how scientists were acquiring their
information, and a new change in physician ethics emerged.8 The
evolution called for new ideals regarding informed consent.9 To
comply, the National Institute of Health (NIH) issued a new clinical
manual requiring informed consent.10 Unfortunately, the manual did
not provide a precise definition of the term.11 However, it did require
a volunteer to sign a statement prior to participating in the medical
trial, asserting the volunteer “understand[s] the project and agree[s] to
participate in it,” and, if the volunteer “find[s] [his/her] assigned
project to be intolerable, [the volunteer] may withdraw from it.”12
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) followed suit,
although it defined informed consent as “the person [having] the
ability to exercise choice.”13 It further required the person “receive a
‘fair explanation’ of the procedure, including an understanding of the
experiment’s purpose and duration, ‘all inconveniences and hazards
reasonably to be expected,’ the nature of a controlled trial (and the
possibility of going on a placebo), and any existing alternative forms
of therapy available.”14
The spark of this “most remarkable—and thoroughly
controversial—transformation” was media coverage of various private
medical trials.15 In 1962, one example caught the attention of
Congress and the media when a drug, not yet evaluated by the FDA,
was given “on an experimental basis” to women at risk for
complications such as “spontaneous abortion” and “premature

7

See DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF HOW LAW
AND BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING 1 (1991).
8

Id. at 88-89.
Id. at 89.
10
Id. at 91.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 92.
13
Id. at 93.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 1; see also id. at 74. One study, for example, occurred in an institution for
mentally ill children where a mild form of hepatitis was endemic. Id. The existing
presence of the virus was used as grounds for artificially introducing the hepatitis
virus to other children in the home. Id. When the study was publicized, it was
described as “risk[ing]… injury… for the benefit of others.” Id.
9
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delivery.”16 The drug was taken by 20,000 American women, which
included 3,750 women of childbearing age and 624 pregnant women.17
However, these women did not know they were part of an
experimental drug testing program and, as such, had not given
informed consent.18
Thereafter, a Senator from New York, Jacob Javits, proposed
an amendment to the Kefauver Bill, which enabled pharmaceutical
medication testing for safety and efficacy, to compel:
the secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)
to issue regulations that no such [experimental] drug
may be administered to any human being in any clinical
investigation unless . . . that human being has been
appropriately advised that such drug has not been
determined to be safe in use for human beings.19
However, Senator Javits’ amendment to the bill was not successful.20
Almost a decade later, Congress again discovered a grave
miscarriage of ethical considerations. In 1972, the Tuskegee syphilis
experiments became known to the public.21 Initiated by the U.S.
Public Health Service, the Tuskegee syphilis program began in 1932,
and it focused on African-American men from the South who were
believed to be “particularly susceptible to venereal diseases.”22 Over
600 men were recruited, two-thirds of which were given the live
syphilis virus.23 Although the participants were told they were being
treated for “bad blood,” they received “painful diagnostic procedures”
that would implant and grow syphilis, rather than treat it.24 The men
involved also received mercury treatments that eased the symptoms of
syphilis.25

16

Id. at 63-64.
Id. at 64.
18
Id.
19
Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
20
Id. at 64, 66-67 (explaining that the Javits amendment, once it merged from the
legislature, required consent “except where [investigators] deem it not feasible or, in
their best professional judgment, contrary to the best interests of such human
beings,” essentially leaving consent up to the discretion of researchers).
21
KELLY BARTH, HUMAN MEDICAL TRIALS 25 (2005).
22
Id. at 11-12.
23
Id. at 26, 40.
24
Id. at 12 (citation omitted). Also note that, beginning in the 1940s, penicillin could
have been used to treat syphilis, but none of the participants were given penicillin for
treatment. See id.
25
Id.
17
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The Tuskegee study lasted for forty years.26 While the men
received only $25.00 for participating in the program, the Tuskegee
victims received a collective settlement of ten million dollars in
1974.27 Then, in 1997, President Bill Clinton formally apologized to
the victims and their families for the “clearly racist” study that was
“orchestrated” by the federal government.28
Despite these events, the medical community is still debating
the topic of informed consent today. For example, in 2009, the
Gardasil vaccine received serious backlash regarding its efficacy and
safety.29 One of the top researchers of Gardasil and HPV vaccinations,
Dr. Diane Harper, came out against the drug, stating that “the benefit
to public health is nothing, there is no reduction in cervical cancers.”30
While Merck, the drug’s manufacturer, and the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) have stated that adequate warnings,
such as “soreness at the injection site and risk of fainting after
vaccination” are provided, questions remain whether more might be
necessary.31 Further, while no link is established, girls that received
the vaccination have had episodes of blood clots, developed Lou
Gehrig’s Disease (ALS), and even died.32
Before this came to light, in 2008, in the United Kingdom,
2,000 girls were given the vaccine and developed side-effects that
included “nausea, dizziness, blurred vision, convulsions, seizures, and
hyperventilation [with] 4,602 suspected side-effects recorded in total
[and] the most tragic case involv[ing] a 14-year-old girl who dropped
dead in the corridor of her school an hour after receiving the
vaccination.”33 However, the complete range of reported symptoms
experienced from the vaccine was not included in the CDC’s
warning.34 Dr. Harper stated that “[p]arents and women must know
that deaths occurred.”35
Further, Dr. Harper advised that the warning should be more
complete and include “that protection from the vaccination might not

26

Id. at 25.
Id. at 37, 25.
28
Id. at 53.
29
See, e.g., Sharyl Attkisson, Gardasil Researcher Speaks Out, CBS NEWS (Aug. 19,
2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/gardasil-researcher-speaks-out/ (discussing
the potential dangers and controversy regarding the vaccination).
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Vera Shirav, Gardasil Vaccine Researcher Drops Bombshell, ALLIANCE FOR HUM.
RES. PROTECTION (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.ahrp.org/cms/content/view/642/103/.
34
Attkisson, supra note 29.
35
Id.
27
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last long enough to provide a cancer protection benefit, and that its
risks—‘small but real’—could occur more often than the cervical
cancer itself would.”36 Therefore, while Gardasil is still available on
the market and encouraged for young girls and women, there are
important details not widely known about this vaccine. Clearly the
notion of informed consent has made significant advancements since
World War II, but whether informed consent has evolved far enough
within the medical community is unclear.
III.

THE HISTORY OF MKULTRA

Beginning in the late 1940s and continuing through the next
three decades, the U.S. military and the CIA initiated programs to
study human behavior.37
Many of the programs, specifically
MKULTRA, were initiated as a retaliatory effort because of fears that
the Soviet Union was “engaged in intensive efforts to produce LSD.”38
The research conducted and sponsored by the CIA would give the
agency an understanding of “the mechanisms by which these
substance[s] worked and how their effects could be defeated.”39
The U.S. Navy initiated Project Chatter in 1947.40 The
program tested the use of drugs for their utility in interrogation and
recruitment.41 Drugs such as anabasis uphylla, scopolamine, and
mescaline were used on humans to “determine their speech-inducing
qualities.”42 Project Chatter was engaged throughout the Korean War,
and it was terminated in 1953.43
In 1950, Project Bluebird was approved and initiated by the
CIA.44 Bluebird had several objectives, among them “conditioning
personnel to prevent unauthorized extraction of information,”
controlling persons in interrogations, “memory enhancement,” and
“preventing hostile control of Agency personnel.”45 After initiating

36

Id.
Project MKULTRA, The CIA’s Program of Research in Behavior Modification:
Joint Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Intelligence Activities & the Subcomm. on
Health & Sci. Research, 95th Cong. 385-86 (1977), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/13inmate_ProjectMKULTRA.pdf.
38
Id. at 72.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 67.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
37
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the Project Bluebird, another program directive, Project Artichoke,
was engaged to evaluate the “offensive use of unconventional
interrogation techniques, including hypnosis and drugs.”46 Project
Artichoke included “in-house experiments on interrogation techniques,
conducted ‘under medical and security controls, which would ensure
that no damage was done to individuals who volunteer[ed] for the
experiments.’”47
Under Project MKNAOMI, the U.S. Army, in 1952, agreed to
assist the CIA in “developing, testing, and maintaining biological
agents and delivery systems.”48 The Army provided the CIA with
darts containing “biological agents” and pills that contained “several
different biological agents” the CIA could use to develop biological
weapons.49 This project continued until 1970, when President Nixon
ordered that biological weapons capable of killing or incapacitating
could not be kept.50
Finally, MKULTRA was approved in 1953 to develop
chemical and biological weapons that would be used in the future to
“control human behavior” in “clandestine operations.”51 MKULTRA
was classified in 1963, after the Inspector General’s survey produced
several reasons why the project should be considered “sensitive,”
including:
(a) Research in the manipulation of human behavior is
considered by many authorities in medicine and
related fields to be professionally unethical,
therefore the reputation of the professional
participants in MKULTRA program are on occasion
in jeopardy.
(b) Some MKULTRA activities raise questions of
legality implicit in the original charter.
(c) A final phase of the testing of MKULTRA products
places the rights and interests of U.S. citizens in
jeopardy.
(d) Public disclosures of some aspects of MKULTRA
activity could induce serious adverse reaction in
U.S. public opinion, as well as stimulate offensive

46

Id.
Id. at 67-68.
48
Id. at 68-69.
49
Id. at 69.
50
Id.
51
Id.
47
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and defensive action in this field on the part of
foreign intelligence services.52
MKULTRA ran from 1953 to 1964, and experimented with
“radiation, electroshock, . . . harassment substances, and [the use of]
paramilitary devices and materials.”53 Then CIA Director, Admiral
Stansfield Turner, testified to Congress in 1977 that this was solely a
CIA project; there was “no evidence within the Agency of any
involvement at higher echelons, the White House, for instance, or
specific approval.”54 Although the Admiral was careful to avoid
stating that the program was purposely shielded from the President of
the United States, he commented that the President knew nothing
about the testing conducted on U.S. citizens and military personnel.55
MKULTRA had three different phases of research: “first, the
search for materials suitable for study; second, laboratory testing on
voluntary human subjects in various types of institutions; third, the
application of MKULTRA materials in normal life settings.”56 While
substances to experiment with were not difficult to discover, how and
where did the CIA find “voluntary” subjects to test the use of mindaltering drugs? The answer to that question, obviously, is where
numerous people were stripped of their resolve and autonomy—
namely, hospitals and prisons.57
The first study was initiated in the National Institute of Mental
Health, and tested drugs and hallucinogens on patients (usually
prisoners) at the Addiction Research Center.58 This center essentially
became “a prison for drug addicts serving sentences for drug
violations,” in that the CIA then subjected the drug offenders to drug
use in order to monitor hallucinogenic effects.59 Although the
Congressional Report states that these “test subjects were volunteer
prisoners,” it also says that only a physical test and a general consent
form were required before administering these mind altering drugs.60
Were there any psychological evaluations? Was history of prior
substance abuse taken into account? Did it matter how long a prisoner

52

Id. at 70.
Id. at 4, 70.
54
Id. at 13.
55
Id. at 13-14.
56
Id. at 70.
57
Id. at 71.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
53
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had been drug-free before asking them to “volunteer” to be fed
government drugs?
The CIA did not seem particularly troubled with these
questions, and eventually admitted to using LSD in “surreptitious
administration of unwitting nonvolunteer subjects in normal life
settings.”61 The CIA began this program to research the “full pattern
of reaction” on various test subjects, including “individuals at all
social levels, high and low, Native American and foreign.”62 The
information gathered from MKULTRA was used for “harassment,
discrediting, or disabling persons” in interrogation settings.63
However, not only did the CIA discover an interest in the
effects of LSD, the U.S. Army began its own experimentations.64 The
Army tested LSD on three different groups of soldiers:
In the first [group], LSD was administered to more than
1,000 American soldiers who volunteered to be subjects
in chemical warfare experiments. In the second phase .
. . 95 volunteers received LSD in clinical experiments
designed to evaluate potential intelligence uses of the
drug. In the third phase, . . . 16 unwitting nonvolunteer
subjects were interrogated after receiving LSD as part
of operational field tests.65
It appeared MKULTRA’s experimentation knew no bounds,
and in the 1977 Congressional Hearing, Admiral Turner testified on
the known extent of the program.66 Despite widespread document
destruction after the program ended, Admiral Turner claimed he was
working closely with the Attorney General to identify the individuals
used as unwitting test subjects, since names were not recorded.67
However, when asked whether he could provide a list of all individuals
involved and whether they were voluntary or involuntarily subjects,
Admiral Turner responded that he could.68 He does not, however,
explain how he could provide such a list without knowledge of their
identity.69 Senator Kennedy posed the next question to the Admiral:

61

Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
63
Id.
64
Id. at 11, 72.
65
Id. at 72.
66
Id. at 4-5.
67
Id. at 86.
68
Id. at 36.
69
Id.
62
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“It is your intention to notify the individuals who have been the
subjects of the research . . . ?”70 The Admiral simply answered yes, so
Senator Kennedy pushed further stating, “If you can identify them, you
intend to notify them.”71 The Admiral agreed.72
Senator Kennedy then asked whether the Admiral could
identify all universities and research centers that were involved; again,
the Admiral answered in the affirmative.73 While Senator Kennedy
wanted these institutions named, the Admiral stated policy reasons for
non-disclosure, including the facilities’ reputations.74 However, the
Admiral stated that he “already notified one institution because the
involvement was so extensive that I thought they really needed to
protect themselves . . . .”75
Although the Admiral provided no additional information on
the identity of the university, it came to light that the University of
Maryland President, Wilson H. Elkins, received a letter from the
Department of the Army, dated October 14, 1975, two years prior to
the Congressional Hearing.76 The letter sought information regarding
any follow-up studies that the university had conducted on its own,
and whether it could provide information on individual test subjects
and members of the university involved.77 President Elkin’s response
stated that “the contract with the Army Medical Research and
Development Command and the University of Maryland stipulated
that the studies were Secret, so that all records were either turned over
the Army or destroyed.”78 However, Elkins provided three names of
personnel at the University of Maryland who were involved.79 Indeed,
one such faculty member, Walter Weintraub, the Director of Graduate
Education for the Department of Psychiatry at the University of
Maryland School of Medicine, wrote numerous articles regarding drug

70

Id.
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 37.
76
Letter from Dr. Kenneth R. Dirks, Brigadier Gen., U.S. Army Med. Research &
Dev. Command, to Wilson H. Elkins, President, Univ. of Md. (Oct. 14, 1975) (on
file with author).
77
Id.
78
Letter from Wilson H. Elkins, President, Univ. of Md., to Dr. Kenneth R. Dirks,
Brigadier Gen., U.S. Army Med. Research & Dev. Command (Dec. 23, 1975) (on
file with author).
79
Id.
71
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use and testing.80 Regarding follow-up studies, Elkins commented:
“The institution, of course has no authority to conduct follow-up
studies on military personnel, and there is no record of civilian studies
so that we are not considering conducting such a follow-up.”81
Strangely enough, around the same time as this Congressional
Hearing, the University of Maryland received another communication,
this time from the CIA itself.82 In a Board of Regents meeting,
President Elkins noted that the CIA accused the university of
providing money to conduct MKULTRA research.83 However, Elkins
stated that, although the CIA may have record of a $3,750 grant in
1956 for “study of the effect of blood vessels of certain camphoric acid
derivatives,” the university received the grant from “a private
organization.”84 Elkins stated that the “University had no indication
[the] CIA was the source of the funds,” and that the “University had no
other direct or indirect involvement with Project MKULTRA.”85
However, the University of Maryland has yet to find this 1977 letter
about MKULTRA funding from the CIA.86 Indeed, the only record of
the letter is Elkin’s reference to it in the Board of Regents meeting.87
Other documents relating to MKULTRA have been slowly
released by the CIA, one page at a time. In 1998, the CIA’s Office of
General Counsel released a letter (with names redacted), dated October
3, 1977, which was addressed to the California Medical Facility.88
The letter included documents to address the extent of the facility’s
involvement and stated:

80

Id. See generally Walter Weintraub, The Clinical Use and Misuse of
Tranquilizers, 3 MD. ST. MED. J. (1962); Walter Weintraub & H. Aronson, Clinical
Judgment in Psychopharmacological Research, 5 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY 65-70
(1963); Walter Weintraub et al., The Influence of Varying Dosage on the Effects of
Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (LSD-25) in Humans, 132 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL
DISEASE 404 (1961). As evidenced above, Weintraub’s articles indicate his
involvement in the LSD study.
81
See Letter from Elkins, supra note 78.
82
Wilson H. Elkins, President, Univ. of Md., Remarks at the Board of Regents
Special Meeting (Aug. 19, 1977) (on file with author).
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Email from Archivist, Univ. of Md., to Brandy Disbennett (Nov. 6, 2013) (on file
with author).
87
Id.
88
Letter from Cent. Intelligence Agency, Office of Gen. Counsel, to Dr. T.L.
Clanon, Cal. Med. Facility (Oct. 3, 1977), available at
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000
196947.pdf.
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These materials are in the same form in which they
have been made available to the public except that, in
order to allow you to judge the nature and extent of the
Facility’s involvement, the name of the Facility and
SIMPR have been reinserted wherever they appear in
the original documents.89
Then, in 2002, the CIA released an account of funds to
institutions regarding the projects and budgets.90 The latest release,
from 2006, is an office memorandum labeled “Notes for DDCI”
(Deputy Director of Central Intelligence), dated August 3, 1964.91 The
drafting party has been redacted and includes three points, but only the
last is pertinent:
We are holding the papers for your session with the
Director, et. al, today on MKSEARCH, the program for
testing exotic drugs on unwitting Americans. A presession with Helms, Gottlieb, and Earman is tentatively
scheduled for 2:00 today for a meeting with the DCI at
2:30. Since the DCI has a 1:00 lunch appointment with
the President, this may all slip, but I will keep track of it
today.92
Beside the typed text, a handwritten note reads “extremely,
frightfully, and frantically sensitive.”93 This note is most compelling
because Admiral Turner testified that he had no reason to believe the
President had knowledge of the programs, though this memorandum
suggests the Commander-in-Chief may have known exactly what was
occurring.94

89

Id. The letter subsequently states: “The information which remains deleted
includes the names of all other institutions and organizations, all individuals, and
CIA employees, except those who have been publicly acknowledged by the Agency
at some prior time.”
90
Memorandum from Cent. Intelligence Agency on Project MKULTRA (Dec. 5,
1956), available at
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000
707674.pdf.
91
Memorandum for Deputy Dir. of Cent. Intelligence (Aug. 3, 1964), available at
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/5829/CIARDP80B01676R001300100015-3.pdf.
92
Id.
93
Id. Though difficult to read in the original, the last word appears to be “sensitive.”
94
Project MKULTRA, supra note 37, at 13-14. Here, again, the Admiral states that
he has been assured “there is no evidence within the Agency of any involvement at
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A CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM

Knowing that MKULTRA existed and was used as an
experimental drug program on unwitting Americans, the question
becomes, what can that soldier do now? While a well-established rule
would grant a lay citizen relief for a violation of the United States
Constitution, such as an unreasonable search and seizure, this rule does
not apply to service members with a claim against their superior
officers during active duty.95 For reasons discussed in the following
cases, the Supreme Court has not found it appropriate to extend a
remedy to veterans whose constitutionally protected rights were
violated while in the service.
First, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, the Court held that a violation of the Constitution
by a government actor gives rise to damages for an individual.96 The
Court relied heavily on Bell v. Hood, and stated that “where federally
protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the
beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to
grant the necessary relief.”97
Articulating the “special factors” test, the Court found there
were “no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of
affirmative action by Congress.”98 The Court implied that, without
congressional intent to create a remedy, a court should not create a
remedy on its own.99 For example, the Court referenced United States
v. Standard Oil, where the Court found that the case involved “federal
fiscal policy,” and, therefore, Congress should create the remedy, not
the courts.100

higher echelons, the White House, for instance, or specific approval.” Also note that
MKSEARCH was a follow-up program to MKULTRA.
95
See Bivens v. Several Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 389, 396 (1971) (holding that the violation of a constitutional right by
a federal agent acting under his authority gives rise to an action for damages from the
constitutional violation, but that the doctrine may not be extended when “special
factors” apply). But see United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 671 (1987) (finding
that a Bivens claim is not permitted when a service member’s injury stems from an
action that is “incident to service”); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 298, 304
(1983) (holding that “special factors” prevent service members from seeking
damages for a Bivens claim).
96
See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
97
Id. at 392 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S 678, 684 (1946)).
98
Id. at 396.
99
Id. at 396-97.
100
Id. at 396 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 311 (1947)).
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Twelve years after Bivens, the Court in Chappell v. Wallace
held that service members may not recover damages for constitutional
violations arising while in-service, a Bivens-type claim.101 Due to the
“peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors” and
“inescapable demands” in the military that call for “immediate
compliance with military procedures and orders [that] must be
virtually reflex,” the Court found it appropriate to deny the petitioner’s
claim.102
Further, in analyzing the Bivens special factors test, the Court
found that a congressionally created remedy existed and should be
utilized.103 Congress created the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) for service members to “avail themselves of the procedures
and remedies created by Congress.”104 The Court indicated the
petitioners should have sought redress in the UCMJ instead of within
the court system, and this conclusion would also support the Court’s
finding that “special factors” prohibited this claim.105 Due to the
creation of the UCMJ, the Court decided there can be no remedy for a
service member bringing claims of constitutional violations against
their superior officers.106
The doctrines of Bivens and Chappell intersected once again
when U.S. Army Master Sergeant James B. Stanley filed a complaint
alleging unwitting exposure to lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) while
in the service.107 In February of 1958, Master Sergeant Stanley
participated in a program that was “designed to test the effectiveness
of protective clothing and equipment as defenses against chemical
warfare.”108 However, during this program, Stanley was given,
unbeknownst to him, doses of LSD.109 The Army’s purpose in
secretly dosing volunteers was “to study the effects of the drug on
human subjects.”110
Stanley was not aware of the LSD testing until December 10,
1975, when the Army sent him a letter, inquiring about the long-term
effects of LSD on the “volunteers” in the 1958 study.111 Stanley

101

Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 (1983).
Id. at 300 (quoting United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954)).
103
Id. at 299. Note that the Court here applied a Feres analysis due to pertinent
policy concerns. Id. at 299-304.
104
Id. at 302.
105
See id. at 303.
106
Id. at 304.
107
United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 671 (1987).
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
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Id.
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brought suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, “alleging negligence
in the administration, supervision, and subsequent monitoring of the
drug testing program.”112
Stanley contended that the LSD caused him to experience
“hallucinations,” “incoherence,” “memory loss,” and “impaired . . .
military performance,” along with periods of violence towards his
family.113 He reported that, on occasion, he would “awake from sleep
at night and, without reason, violently beat his wife and children, later
being unable to recall the entire incident.”114 After Stanley was
discharged in 1969, he and his wife divorced, due to “personality
changes wrought by the LSD.”115
Chappell was issued during the time Stanley was still fighting
to appear in district court.116 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Stanley because the Circuits Courts had inconsistently applied
Chappell against Bivens-type claims, and there was no clear guidance
for courts on whether Chappell served as a direct bar to Bivens
actions.117
Stanley attempted to distinguish his case from Chappell
through two distinct arguments.118 First, Stanley argued that his injury
was in no way “incident to service.”119 Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, stated that “[i]f that argument is sound, then even if Feres
principles apply fully to Bivens actions, further proceedings are
necessary to determine whether they apply to this case.”120 Stanley
also argued that the individuals who gave him LSD were not his
superior officers and “may well have been civilian personnel.”121
Because of this, the Court admitted Chappell is “not strictly
controlling.”122 Unlike the civilian military scientists in Stanley,
Chappell’s case involved superior officers, and policy concerns
supported denying the claim against superior officers because they
should be able to make decisions quickly.123 Here, however, the
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Id. at 672; see also Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (2014).
Note that the effect of the Feres doctrine barred the claim because Stanley was on
active duty at the time of the alleged negligence. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 672.
113
Stanley, 483 U.S. at 671.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 674.
117
Id. at 676.
118
Id. at 679-80.
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Id. at 680.
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Id.
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Id. at 679.
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Id. at 680.
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Id.
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policy concerns of Chappell do not support Stanley’s claim because
the conduct may not have been performed by military personnel.124
Nevertheless, the Court did not find that Stanley’s assertions
distinguished the case from Chappell’s other policy concerns.125 The
Constitution imbued Congress with such articulated powers, and
where military concerns are involved, the Court will not extend a
remedy in a situation absent Congressional action.126 Further, Justice
Scalia stated that the creation of a remedy by the court system, in spite
of Congress, would be “inappropriate.”127 Ultimately, the Court
reaffirmed Chappell and the use of the special factors test.128
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor concurred in part and dissented
in part to the majority decision.129 She asserted that the holdings in
Chappell and Feres should be “read together” as “both cases
unmistakably stand for the proposition that the special circumstances
of the military mandate that civilian courts avoid entertaining a suit
involving harm caused as a result of military service.”130 In reading
the cases together, a claim brought by a service member, having arisen
out of even “negligence, recklessness, [or] deliberate indifference” by
the military would not survive a Bivens-type analysis.131 However,
Justice O’Connor continued, stating that Chappell is applicable only to
harms that “arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to
service.”132 In Stanley’s case, however, Justice O’Connor believed
that this harm was not incident to service, stating, “In my view,
conduct of the type alleged in this case is so far beyond the bounds of
human decency that as a matter of law it simply cannot be considered
a part of the military mission.”133 She would, therefore, have granted
Stanley’s claim the ability to be heard in court under a Bivens analysis,
stating that “[n]o judicially crafted rule should insulate from liability
the involuntary and unknowing human experimentation alleged.”134
Nonetheless, Stanley’s day in court remained denied.
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Id. at 705.
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Id. at 682.
127
Id. at 683.
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Id.
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Id. at 708.
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Id. at 709.
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Id.
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Id. (quoting Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950)).
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A. MKULTRA in Court Today
If another MKULTRA victim brought a claim in court today,
the resolution undoubtedly would be similar to Stanley. Thus, Stanley
and other similarly situated veterans cannot bring a claim against the
federal government for constitutional violations. Even when Stanley
attempted to distinguish himself in pivotal ways from Chappell,
including that the conduct alleged was not by his superior officers, the
Court nonetheless found that unwittingly dosing service members with
LSD was incident to service and, therefore, Chappell and Feres barred
Stanley’s claim.
Despite grave violations of constitutionally protected rights, the
United States Supreme Court decided that veterans may not receive a
judicial remedy because it would be contrary to congressional intent.
But the ultimate effect of the Supreme Court’s decision is the same as
stating that Congress would deny due process of the law to veterans.
Even further, Congress expected that veterans who were unknowingly
dosed with LSD in service should avail themselves of congressionally
created remedies, such as the UCMJ.
How far must the factual scenario go to demonstrate that
human experimentation is not part of the military mission and,
therefore, not incident to service? Would it have been enough if
Stanley knew, without a doubt, that civilians had given him LSD
without his knowledge? Does it matter that Stanley did not learn of
his harm until after he was discharged from the Army? What can an
individual do without proof?
V.

THE FERES DOCTRINE

Feres v. United States is a landmark decision in the history of
the Supreme Court. It created the Feres Doctrine, which is the main
hurdle for service members and veterans recovering in a tort action
against the armed forces and their superior officers. The Court in
Feres looked at three different factual scenarios: the “Feres case,” the
“Jefferson case,” and the “Griggs case.”135
In the Feres case, a soldier was in his barracks when it caught
fire and killed him.136 His estate alleged that the military was
negligent in quartering the service member there when it knew, or
should have known, that the barracks were “unsafe because of a

135
136

Feres, 340 U.S. at 136-37.
Id. at 137.
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defective heating plant.”137 The Jefferson case involved a service
member who underwent an abdominal surgery and, eight months later,
“a towel 30 inches long by 18 inches wide, marked ‘Medical
Department U.S. Army’” was extracted from his stomach.138 Finally,
the Griggs case dealt with issues of negligence and “unskillful medical
treatment” that caused the service member’s death.139 The Court
articulated the common underlying theme in all three cases: the
plaintiffs were on active duty and “sustained injury due to negligence
of others in the armed forces.”140
The Court examined whether the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA)141 provided legal recourse to a service member who sustained
a harm due to negligence on behalf of the armed forces when the harm
was acquired “incident to the service.”142 First, the FTCA excludes
recovery from “[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of
the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of
war.”143 The Court then discussed several arguments as to why the
FTCA must also bar service members’ negligence claims.144
The Court in Feres determined that there were a number of
inequalities that would arise, should a service member be able to sue
the armed forces.145 Notably, noting the fact that a soldier is not able
to choose his station, the Court paints a picture that a veteran could be
a victim of tort law because he is forced to reside in a particular state
or territory, and this is inherently unfair.146
The Court also relied on the special connection between a
soldier and his command, as a distinct federal relationship between
service members and the government that is “derived from federal
sources and governed by federal authority.”147 The Court commented
that the FTCA is a congressional exercise of power and it is intended
to fit into the scope of other remedies, such as “systems of simple,
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Id.
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 138.
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Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (2014). The FTCA
authorizes civil tort suits to be brought against the United States. See H.R. 2249,
110th Cong. (2007).
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Feres, 340 U.S. at 138.
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Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j)).
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Id. at 139.
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certain, and uniform compensation for injuries or death of those in
armed services.”148
The Court looked to the Department of Veterans Affairs and its
disability compensation system as the appropriate remedy, stating the
VA system “normally requires no litigation [and] is not negligible or
niggardly . . . .”149 The Court also articulated that “a soldier is at
peculiar disadvantage in litigation,” in that the “[l]ack of time and
money” and “difficulty if not impossibility of procuring witnesses”
would severely affect the soldier’s ability to defend himself in tort
litigation.150
The important question then is whether Feres is still modern in
its policy concerns. The VA system that is intended to provide a
veteran with a fair and equitable remedy is no longer an efficient
system.151
Further, the information gathering for a disability
compensation claim is similar to that which a veteran would have to
show in a court environment.152
Feres should not bar claims brought by veterans concerning
involuntary ingestion of LSD due to the nature of CIA-initiated human
experimentation programs. In a 1994 report prepared for the
Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, contributors expressed why Feres
should not apply to MKULTRA victims, stating, “[W]hen
inappropriate experimentation has resulted in suffering for military
personnel, [the Feres doctrine] stands in violation of established
ethical standards . . . .”153 The report further asserted that “Congress
should not apply the Feres Doctrine for military personnel who are
harmed by inappropriate experimentation when informed consent has
not been given.”154 It cited Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Stanley to
support its assertion.155 Justice O’Connor postured that a MKULTRA
victim should not be denied a remedy due to the government’s
“deliberate and calculated exposure of otherwise healthy military
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Id.
Id. at 145.
150
Id.
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See generally JACQUELINE MAFFUCCI, THE BATTLE TO END THE VA BACKLOG
(2014), available at
http://media.iava.org/2014BattleToEndtheVABacklog_PRINT.pdf (discussing the
VA backlog that inhibits access to benefits for veterans).
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Id. at 12-13 (describing the difficulties in collecting evidence for a claim).
153
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON VETERANS AFFAIRS, 103D CONG., IS MILITARY RESEARCH
HAZARDOUS TO VETERANS’ HEALTH? LESSONS SPANNING HALF A CENTURY 45
(Comm. Print 1994).
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personnel to medical experimentation without their consent, outside of
any combat, combat training, or military exigency . . . .”156
The Feres decision relied on the fact that soldiers suffered their
harm “in the course of activity incident to service.”157 However, the
activities of MKULTRA did not involve service members performing
in the course of duty, and, therefore, their harm could not have
occurred incident to service, especially where the participants did not
give informed consent. Further, as Justice O’Connor wrote in her
Stanley dissent, MKULTRA was never in line with a military
mission.158 Even during the course of the program, its validity and
legality were continuously questioned,159 and the leaders of the
programs ordered frequent document destruction.160 These actions
should not be understood to be in the line of duty, in line with the
military mission, or in any other formulation that would excuse a claim
because of the Feres Doctrine’s attention to the “federal sources . . .
governed by federal authority.”161
VI.

DISABILITY COMPENSATION SYSTEM

While the disability compensation system may have been
efficient in the 1950s, it has been severely criticized recently for its
inability to adapt and change its technological deficiencies, its
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Id. (citing United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 709 (1987) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting)).
157
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
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See Stanley, 483 U.S. at 708-10 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
159
Project MKULTRA, supra note 37, at 398. The General Counsel wrote to the
Inspector General after the suicide of an unwitting victim of LSD: “I’m not happy
with what seems to be a very casual attitude on the part of . . . representatives to the
way this experiment was conducted . . . . I do believe, especially when human health
or life is at stake, that at least the prudent, reasonable measures which can be taken to
minimize the risk must be taken and failure to do so was culpable negligence.”
160
See id. at 403-04. Dr. Sidney Gottlieb spoke with the Director of Central
Intelligence, Richard Helms upon his retirement, and Gottlieb believed that “it would
be a good idea if these files were destroyed.” Id. at 403. Helms further remarked
that “we thought we would just get rid of the files as well, so that anybody who
assisted us in the past would not be subject to follow-up or questions,
embarrassment, if you will.” Id. at 403-04. Further, the Select Committee found that
even prior to this document destruction by Helms and Gottlieb, “MKULTRA records
were far from complete” and the Inspector General stated in 1963 that “MKULTRA
record[s] appear . . . to rest in the memories of the principal officers and is therefore
almost certain to be lost with their departures.” Id. at 404 n.7.
161
Feres, 340 U.S. at 144; see also Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 26712680 (2014). Since even an intentional tort claim would be barred by the FTCA, it is
a moot point whether the actions by the CIA and U.S. Army were negligence or
battery. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (2013).
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inaccuracy in claims processing, and its huge backlog and delay in
addressing claims.162 Currently, there are nearly 250,000 claims more
than 125 days old pending at regional Veterans Affairs offices.163 This
number includes claims for original entitlement and for increased
rating evaluation.164 Although the backlog has decreased since 2013,
the overall number of claims has increased and the VA system is still
overburdened by the sheer volume.165 Further, the majority of claims
that are processed require adjudication, and because of the VA’s effort
to reduce backlog, the number of claims in the appeals process has
increased.166 Indeed, appeals have grown by nearly 17%.167 As of
September 2014, over 260,000 claims were currently in the first stages
of the appeals process, and the Court of Appeals for Veteran’s Claims
heard and decided more than 3,800 appeals in 2013.168
In order to be successful in a claim for service-connected
disability, a veteran must show: (1) medical evidence of a current
diagnosed physical or mental disability; (2) evidence of an event,
injury, or disease in service; and (3) a link between his current
disability and the event, injury or disease in service, usually supported
by medical evidence.169
While the VA does have a statutory duty to assist veterans in
obtaining necessary evidence,170 the burden initially falls on the
veteran to collect and identify the following: (1) information from his
service record as to an in service injury; (2) current medical
162

See MAFFUCCI, supra note 151, at 3-4.
2014 Performance and Accountability Report Part I, DEP’T. OF VETERAN AFF.,
Nov. 17, 2014, at 2, available at http://www.va.gov/budget/docs/report/2014VAparPartI.pdf.
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2014 Performance and Accountability Report Part II, DEP’T. OF VETERAN AFF.,
Nov. 17, 2014, at 3, available at http://www.va.gov/budget/docs/report/2014VAparPartII.pdf.
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Id. (discussing the various challenges faced by the VA, including the increased
complexity of claims).
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Id. at 97.
167
Id. at 3.
168
Id. at 98; Performance and Accountability Report, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR
VETERANS CLAIMS (2013), at 3, available at
http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/FY2013PerformanceAccountabilityReport.
pdf.
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See Claims and Evidence: FDC Checklist for Disability Compensation, DEP’T OF
VETERANS AFF., http://www.benefits.va.gov/fdc/checklist.asp (last visited Feb. 16,
2014); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) (2013) (“Service connection connotes many
factors but basically it means that the facts, shown by evidence, establish that a
particular injury or disease resulting in disability was incurred coincident with
service in the armed forces, or if preexisting such service, was aggravated therein.”).
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See 38 U.S.C. § 5103A (2013) (stating that the VA has a duty to assist claimants
in obtaining evidence); 38 C.F.R. § 21.1032 (2013).
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documentation that denotes an injury in-service; and (3) current
documents that correlate the two conditions (for example, a letter from
a doctor reconciling the veteran’s in-service injury and the current
condition).171 In proving their claims, combat veterans frequently
resort to buddy statements to prove the occurrence of events or verify
an in-service stressor.172
An MKULTRA victim will likely meet only one of the
necessary burdens. For example, he or she may have proof of their
participation in the program, such as a letter similar to the one Stanley
received. Or, he or she may have a current diagnosed condition, such
as chronic paranoia or anxiety. However, they would need both,
simultaneously, to proceed. Moreover, he or she would need a doctor
willing to write a statement verifying that their condition was caused
by LSD exposure sometime during the 1950s and 1960s.
But assume a particular victim can meet all of the burdens—
that they have a current diagnosed condition, that their doctor has
reviewed their military records and treatment history and is willing to
write a letter stating their belief that the veteran’s condition is likely
related to LSD exposure in the service. Then, how will this particular
veteran also prove that they were, in fact, given LSD unwittingly?
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
recently decided a case from the Court of Appeals for Veterans’
Claims that related to the burden of proof in VA claims.173 AZ v.
Shinseki involved a service-connection claim for Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD) as a result of sexual assault that occurred inservice.174 However, prior adjudication denied the appellant’s claim
because her military service records did not contain treatment records
of a sexual assault.175 According to 38 U.S.C. § 5107:
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See Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1166-67 (Fed. Cir. 2004). A veteran
must show: “(1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or
aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present
disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service.” Id. (citing
Hansen v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 110, 111 (Vet. App. 2002)).
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See Special Rules for Combat Veterans Proving “In Service Occurrence or
Aggravation of a Disease or Injury,” AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, at 2, available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/young_lawyers/project_
salute/cb_d2_f26_special_rules_for_combat_veterans_proving_in_service_occurren
ce_or_aggravation_of_a_disease_or_injury.authcheckdam.pdf.
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See AZ v. Shinseki, 731 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
174
Id.
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Id. at 1305-06.
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The Secretary shall consider all information and lay and
medical evidence of record in a case before the
Secretary with respect to benefits under laws
administered by the Secretary. When there is an
approximate balance of positive and negative evidence
regarding any issue material to the determination of a
matter, the Secretary shall give the benefit of the doubt
to the claimant.176
However, AZ is not about the appellant having documented
evidence weighed against her; rather, it is about having the lack of
evidence weighed against her.177 While the statute addresses the
weight of positive and negative evidence, it does not address the
weight of an absence of evidence.178 The court explained that “[t]he
absence of certain evidence may be pertinent if it tends to disprove (or
prove) a material fact.”179 However, in exploring the facts before it,
the court found that “servicemen and servicewomen who experience
in-service sexual assaults face ‘unique’ disincentives to report.”180 For
example, servicewomen failed to report sexual assault because of “fear
of retaliation or reprisals,” fear of the stigma associated with reporting,
or fear they would “appear weak or incapable of performing their
mission.”181 The court also cited to a 2010 report from the Sexual
Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) that reviewed the
last six years of reporting and found that less than 15% of service
members who were victims of sexual assault reported the event to the
military.182
Thus, the question before the court in AZ was whether the VA
could recognize a service connection for the other 85% of service
members who did not report their sexual assault due to fear.183 The
Federal Circuit reviewed, in depth, the common law rules of evidence
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Id. at 1310 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) (2013)).
Id. at 1311.
178
Id.; see also 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) (2013).
179
AZ, 731 F.3d at 1311.
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Id. (citing Sexual Assault Prevention & Response Report, U.S. DEP’T. OF DEF.
(2010), at 20, available at
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Id. at 1314 (citing Sexual Assault Prevention & Response Report, U.S. DEP’T. OF
DEF. (2010), at 53, available at
http://www.sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/DoD_Fiscal_Year_2010_Annual_Report_o
n_Sexual_Assault_in_the_Military.pdf).
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and the Federal Rules of Evidence, and answered the question in the
affirmative.184 The court held that the VA can grant service
connection for those victims that did not report.185
Where no such record would have existed, the common law
rules of evidence would admit the absence thereof as evidence that the
transaction did not occur, if the record is one that “naturally would
have been made if the transaction had occurred.”186 This common law
rule of evidence has been widely adopted by lower courts.187 It then
became an exception to the Federal Rules of Evidence’s hearsay rules,
specifically Rule 803(7) and Rule 803(10).188 The court stated that
“both rules require for admissibility that ‘a record was regularly kept’
for the type of event in question.”189 Also, “[e]vidence that an entry is
missing from a deficient record is inadmissible” under the Federal
Rules of Evidence.190
However, referring to Buczynski v. Shinseki, the Federal Circuit
found that “the Board [of Veterans Appeals] may not consider the
absence of [administrative record] evidence as substantive negative
evidence” against a claim.191 Further, consistent with its holding in
Fagan v. Shinseki, the Federal Circuit concluded evidence that does
not lend positive or negative support to a veteran’s claim for serviceconnection is not “pertinent evidence” as to the veteran’s claim.192 In
AZ, the court found that not reporting a sexual assault, due to the
nature of the crime, cannot be regarded as evidence that the assault did
not occur.193
Policy concerns also support the holding in AZ. For example,
the court discussed that the veteran’s benefits system should be based
on “solicitude for the claimant.”194 Congress “relaxed evidentiary
requirements” for veterans in the VA system, so to “penalize” a victim
of sexual assault for not reporting to their superior officer “would
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Id. at 1322.
186
Id. at 1315 (citing 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW § 1531, at 463).
187
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hardly comport with a system in which ‘the importance of systemic
fairness and the appearance of fairness carries great weight.’”195
A. The Expansive Effect of AZ v. Shinseki
The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC) has
embraced the Federal Circuit’s decision in AZ and has given the
holding effect in cases beyond sexual assault. In Helm v. Shinseki, the
veteran, Helm, was seeking service-connection for hearing loss as a
result of noise trauma during service.196 The VA denied the claim due
to lack of records documenting the hearing loss.197 Specifically,
Helm’s statements of complaints of hearing loss were “not credible
based on the lack of objective medical evidence of hearing loss or
tinnitus until many years after service.”198
The court relied on two cases to reverse the Board of Veterans
Appeal’s denial. First, citing Horn v. Shinseki, the CAVC held that the
“absence of evidence cannot be substantive negative evidence,” unless
a veteran first shows a proper foundation that would show that the lack
of record “has a tendency to prove or disprove a relevant fact.”199
Next, referring to AZ, the court noted that “absence of documentation
of a claimed sexual assault in service cannot be considered as evidence
that the assault did not occur . . . .”200 Therefore, the court in Helm,
relying on these two cases, found that the Board improperly held that
the lack of evidence in his medical records weighed negatively against
his claim.201 The CAVC remanded Helm’s claim for reconsideration
by the Board.202

195

Id. (citing Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
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B. AZ v. Shinseki and MKULTRA Victims
An MKULTRA victim should be permitted by the VA to avail
themselves of AZ, its authorities, and subsequent cases because they
are analogous scenarios: a veteran with an injury due to LSD
experimentation, but without proof, is much like a veteran who lacks
evidence of his or her sexual assault.
The first hurdle for MKULTRA victims is proving when,
where, and how they were unwittingly dosed with LSD.
Unfortunately, whether documents exist that could illuminate a
particular veteran’s claim, such as the list of names alluded to in the
Congressional Hearing with Admiral Turner, is unclear.203
There is no exact precedent to show what the Court has done,
or would do, in this situation, but there are some analogies we can
draw based on other factual scenarios. In Boggs v. West, the veteran
alleged harm not from his time in-service, but rather as a result of VA
treatment.204 In 1966, he was admitted to a VA hospital due to
“reactive depression with severe anxiety, mild hysterical features, and
excessive use of denial.”205 One year later, the veteran “consented to
participation in an investigational study of the use of the drug LSD.”206
Two years later, the veteran was given a follow-up examination and
was diagnosed with “chronic severe anxiety reaction.”207 While the
veteran stated he did not want to continue the program after one dose,
he alleged that VA physicians continued to administer doses of LSD
without his consent.208 His doctors supported the conclusion that his
later diagnosis of organic brain syndrome in 1981 was indicative of
“post-LSD syndrome,” but the VA nonetheless denied the claim.209
The CAVC asserted that pre-existing conditions and alcoholism
contributed to his condition, not LSD.210 The CAVC also found it
“highly probative” that there was no evidence after the administration
of LSD that the veteran suffered any ill effects in terms of
employability, or effects to his central nervous system.211 The CAVC
affirmed the Board’s decision based on the idea that the veteran
consented to LSD experimentation, that he had a pre-existing
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condition when entering the VA system, and that the “preponderance
of the evidence shows that the veteran did not incur a superimposed
disability as the result of VA medical treatment in 1967.”212
A second relevant case is Arista v. Shinseki, decided in 2011.213
The veteran was a munitions systems specialist on active duty from
1987 to 1992.214 The veteran had filed a claim for service-connection
for PTSD, but was not able to substantiate his stressor because his
mission was classified.215 The Board decided that he had not
submitted “specific enough information” of his stressors.216 While the
veteran was able to submit a document that was stamped “4SECRET,” he was not able to provide enough evidence to convince
the VA of his claimed stressors.217 The VA continued to request
records, but the veteran was not able to provide any and, in October
2006, stated, “I can’t give you buddy letters because the guys I worked
with can’t say anything either.”218 The CAVC affirmed the Board’s
denial of the veteran’s claim for PTSD.219
These two cases demonstrate that an MKULTRA victim today
would have a difficult time surmounting the VA’s burden of proof.
First, because the program aimed to recruit prisoners and hospitalized
patients with prior drug addictions, later disabilities may be assumed
to be a result of pre-existing conditions, not a result of LSD dosing. 220
Second, any condition that was diagnosed after being given LSD will
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See id. at 336. It should also be noted that when the veteran entered the VA
system with psychological disabilities, it was a year before the VA recruited him into
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be difficult to prove in a medical document, such as a letter connecting
the illness to the LSD, especially if a veteran is only aware that he or
she was given LSD once.
Lastly, as the Arista case demonstrates, the veteran must be
able to access classified records in order to substantiate his claim.221
In Arista, the veteran was not able to obtain the records that he
required and was denied his benefits, even though it is not clear if
records about his injury and actions would have been kept.222
However, in the case of MKULTRA, records were kept, but often
ordered to be destroyed by program directors.223 Moreover, there are
probably documents related to MKULTRA that are still classified.224
Due to the potential impossibility of an MKULTRA victim obtaining
records, the question becomes is AZ expansive enough to allow a
veteran who was subjected to MKULTRA to recover benefits without
vital documents?
If a veteran wanted to obtain service-connection benefits for
receiving unwitting dosages of LSD during service under MKULTRA,
the veteran will not be able to obtain sufficient records to prove that
he/she was a test subject. In light of the absence of records, a veteran
should be able to use AZ to demonstrate that the lack of records is not
probative evidence that the veteran was not used as a test subject in
MKULTRA.225 However, it is important to note that the holding in AZ
was specific to instances of sexual assault, so courts may be unwilling
to extend the holding to LSD exposure under MKULTRA.226
Unreleased documents, or documents destroyed by the government,
are analogous to records that would not have been kept or recorded in
the first place. Both of these scenarios create situations where the
veteran is not able to substantiate his claim because he is not able to
prove his in-service injury or harm. AZ bridged the gap for records
that would not have existed, and it should also bridge the gap for
records that the government destroyed or refuses to release.
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CONCLUSION

Based on the policy considerations enumerated in AZ,
regarding Congress’s legislative intent in creating the VA disability
system, the “relaxed evidentiary requirements” are supposed to
promote a veteran-friendly and non-adversarial system.227 Moreover,
AZ also stated that, to deny a claim based on evidence that would not
have been kept, would not “comport with a system in which ‘the
importance of systemic fairness and the appearance of fairness carries
great weight.’”228 Therefore, in reliance on a system based on fairness
to the veteran, military destruction of documents that would support a
veteran’s claim for a service-connection injury should not be held
against that veteran or his claim. Even given the negative treatment of
comparable scenarios in Boggs and Arista, AZ and Helm should
overcome the evidentiary gaps. Therefore, MKULTRA victims should
have at least a colorable argument against the VA as to why they
deserve service-connection for currently suffered disabilities as a result
of unwitting exposure to LSD by the government.
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